by Major Jeffrey Jarkowsky, US Army is a historical analysis of the German special operations conducted in
support of their overall Ardennes offensive. It focuses on the two major special
operations of the German offensive, Operations "Greif" and "Stoesser." Operation
Greif was the German attempt to infiltrate a commando unit behind American lines
disguised as American soldiers. Operation Stoesser, the last German airborne
operation of the war, was designed to secure a key cross-roads behind American
lines.These special operations failed because of faulty planning, inadequate
preparation, and a lack of coordination between the special and conventional
forces. These problems, exacerbated by a lack of preparation time, resulted in a
pair of ad-hoc units that were unable to accomplish their primary missions,
although the operations were characterized by boldness, initiative, and
improvisation. This study also examines the strategic setting, planning,
preparatiors, and conduct of these operations, as well as their impact on the
overall campaign. This study also examines the key lessons-learned that can be
derived from both operations. Lastly, the study explores the implications of
these lessons for the U.S. military of today.
