Wargaming in Military Education for Army Officers and Officer Cadets

Wargaming has been part of military curricula for about 200 years since the introduction of Kriegsspiel, but it is still something of an art form. This thesis, by Johan Elg,  attempts to theorise the practice of military educational wargaming, and specifically to explore why such wargaming takes the form it does. The thesis is limited to army educational wargaming for officers and officer cadets. Wargaming for analytical purposes, and political and strategic gaming, are excluded. Instead, the focus is on army educational wargaming at the tactical level, which is arguably more comparable between countries. The research method combines an exploratory approach influenced by grounded theory with a comparative case study approach encompassing three successive levels of army officer education in five countries: Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.

Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II | Prewar to March 1943

In this Research Survey, Major Timothy A. Wray provides an excellent survey of the intricacies of employing defensive tactics against a powerful opponent. Using after-action reports, unit war diaries, and other primary materials, Major Wray analyzes the doctrine and tactics that the Germans used on the Eastern Front during World War II. At the end of World War I, the Germans adopted the elastic defense in depth and continued to use it as their basic doctrine through the end of World War II. However, because of limitations caused by difficult terrain, severe weather, manpower and supply shortages, Soviet tactics, and Hitler's order to stand fast, German commanders were unable to implement the Elastic Defense in its true form.

Struggling against Inferiority: German Army Policy, 1890-1914

This thesis by Gavin J. Wiens offers us some insights about the diplomatic and geographic circumstances confronting Germany before the First World War and the maintenance of a large standing army. In 1890 the Prussian Minister of War, Julius von Verdy du Vernois, introduced a long-term program of army expansion intended to increase the number of active formations and provide all able-bodied German males with military training. Whereas considerable political and social obstacles, together with the inauguration of a naval construction program in 1898 precluded its completion, the possibility of a two-front war thereafter ensured that the "realization of compulsory military service" remained the fundamental objective of the General Staff. Not even the return of budgetary preference to the army following the second Moroccan crisis in 1911 and the subsequent approval of substantial army bills in 1912-13 diminished the intense pressure for a large-scale increase in the peacetime-strength and the implementation of the core principles of the "Verdy Plan."

The Operational Leadership of Helmuth von Moltke

A paper by Gary J. Ohis Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps Reserve | "Understanding operational leadership is an important aspect of officer professionalism in the modern American military. By studying the evolution of this concept we can better comprehend its role in the current defense environment, and gain some insights into how it can be applied. Helmuth von Moltke is the prototype model for modern operational leadership. He provides a superb example in both his writings and in his actual application of the military arts. 

The collapse of the German army in the East in the summer of 1944

is a two volume publication, by Stephen Ariel Veal Portland State University. "The collapse of the German Army in the East in the Summer of 1944 is analyzed and determined to be the result of the following specific factors: German intelligence failures; German defensive doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed in the West; Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive doctrine and tactics. The collapse of Army Group Center, the destruction of the XIII Army Corps, and the collapse of Army Group South Ukraine in Romania during the Summer of 1944 are examined in detail. The significance of the collapse of the German Army in the East is compared to events occurring on the Anglo-American fronts and the German losses on both theaters of military operations are compared. The Soviet contributions to the defeat of the German Army during the Summer of 1944 are examined and the views of Soviet historiography and American historiography compared."

German Special Operations in the 1944 Ardennes Offensive

 

by Major Jeffrey Jarkowsky, US  Army is a historical analysis of the German special operations conducted in support of their overall Ardennes offensive. It focuses on the two major special operations of the German offensive, Operations "Greif" and "Stoesser." Operation Greif was the German attempt to infiltrate a commando unit behind American lines disguised as American soldiers. Operation Stoesser, the last German airborne operation of the war, was designed to secure a key cross-roads behind American lines.These special operations failed because of faulty planning, inadequate preparation, and a lack of coordination between the special and conventional forces. These problems, exacerbated by a lack of preparation time, resulted in a pair of ad-hoc units that were unable to accomplish their primary missions, although the operations were characterized by boldness, initiative, and improvisation. This study also examines the strategic setting, planning, preparatiors, and conduct of these operations, as well as their impact on the overall campaign. This study also examines the key lessons-learned that can be derived from both operations. Lastly, the study explores the implications of these lessons for the U.S. military of today.

The lost partnership | Military cooperation of the Reichswehr and the US Army 1918-1933

„We needed to face the task to be able to provide the missing weapons latest at the start of an armed conflict. Similar to the US Army, which during peace times was little more powerful than our Reichswehr, had planned for a case of emergency based on the experience during the world war I in 1917. My journey to the US as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in 1927 provided very good insights for our needs.” This is how General Wilhelm Heye described his visit to the US and started a chapter of relations of the Reichswehr to a foreign force which has not been paid much attention to date. While the secret connections of the Reichswehr to the Red Army have been met with broad scientific interest and were subject of widespread investigation, the collaboration with the U.S. Army has so far not been in the focus of historical research. The missions between 1922 and 1933 of almost 30 officers, including well-known names such as Wilhelm Speidel, Werner von Blomberg and Walter Warlimont, are therefore almost completely unknown. | A Master Thesis by Paul Fröhlich (in German).

Jomini and the Ardennes: An Analysis of Lines of Operation and Decisive Points

This paper, by MAJ Thomas M. McGinnis, USA,  examines the applicability of the theories of the 19th Century military theorist, Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, to modern 20th Century mid-to high-intensity conflict. To do this it briefly reviews the core of Jomin' most famous work, The Art of War. It then tests two key Jominian concepts, lines of operation and decisive points against the reality of a major 20th Century operation, the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944. The study first sets the strategic and operational setting then traces the general conduct of the operation from the corps and army perspective. The first phase studied is the German offensive and American defensive from 16 December to 26 December 1944. The second is the American offensive and German defensive from 22 December 1944 to 28 January 1945. 

The Campaign in Lorraine | Arracourt, September 1944

This battle study,  by Richard H. Barnes, MAJ, US Field Artillery, "...investigates operational and tactical considerations of the battles of Arracourt, which took place in September 1944 as the 4th Armored Division of Patton's Third Army clashed with the Fifth German Panzer Army in the French province of Lorraine on the U.S. drive to the German West Wall. By examining detailed German and American unit histories, logs, and summaries, as well as personal papers, this study illuminates differences and similarities in reporting the U.S. penetration from the Nancy Bridgehead to Arracourt, the German offensive at Luneville as a prelude to Arracourt, and the two German offensives at Arracourt, as the Fifth Panzer Army attempted to link up with a German unit cut off at Nancy. Arracourt exemplifies penetration and mobile defense and illustrates the demand for good intelligence and flexible command and control. It shows the inherent risks of piecemeal commitment of reserves, the need for timely orders and good logistical support, as well as the tactical advantages."

The Campaign of 1777 | Examination of a Turning Point using DIME

... is a Master Thesis, by Jason W. Torgerson, MAJ, US Army. Abstract: "This historical assessment of the American Revolution evaluates the significance of the Campaign of 1777. More specifically, this thesis examines whether the Campaign of 1777 was a turning point in the American Revolution. Each of the four elements of National Power: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME); are used in order to determine whether there was a perceptible increase or decrease in power. The European balance of power dictated the effectiveness of diplomacy..."

Operation 'Market Garden': Case Study

... for Analyzing Senior Leader Responsibilities, by Elizabeth A. Coble, LTC. Abstract: With German forces on the run following the Allied success at Normandy and the breakout and pursuit across France, Allied forces were staged to enter Germany in late summer 1944. Both Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley clamored to be given the priority of effort. General Eisenhower chose Montgomery’s Operation MARKET GARDEN as the plan for action. It called for airborne forces to open the route for a ground force to move more than sixty miles up a single road, ending up north of the Rhine River near Arnhem, Netherlands. By accomplishing this task, the German Ruhr industrial heartland would be within easy grasp. But the operation failed. The ground force did not make it to the last bridge; it was six more months before Allied forces crossed the Lower Rhine River near Arnhem.

Different Opportunities, Different Outcomes – Civil War and Rebel Groups in Angola and Mozambique

This study, by Ana Leão, "... explores the development and dynamics of non-state actors in Angola and Mozambique and so contributes to the ongoing debate at the German Development Institute on the issue of non-state (armed) groups and governance impact on development conditions. The study discusses the effect of various dimensions on the historical process of the two countries from the perspective of the rebel movements: the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola’s case and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) in Mozambique’s. The analysis focuses on two dimensions: geography and endowments."

Victories are not Enough: Limitations of the German Way of War

Abstract: "Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany—and before that nation came into existence, Prussia— produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Even the casual observers should have noted that, despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. This Letort Paper, authored by Dr. Samuel J. Newland, explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals.  He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure, which led to Germany’s defeat in these wars, should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century."

Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia

"This publication was prepared by a number of German officers after the end of World War II. There were a number of these publications, many of which are in publication in the German Report Series by Naval and Military Press. They are all of significant importance in understanding the way in which the war was fought, particularly on the eastern front. This particular publication is perhaps the best known of all the German Report Series, and deals with combat at battalion, company, platoon and even individual level. It is full of small actions that are not reported anywhere else, and the whole book is well illustrated with a series of maps showing the situation of the units and the actions described in such detail." 

A Hopeless Struggle: The Austro-Hungarian Army and total war, 1914-1918

This dissertation, by J.R. Schindler, "... is an institutional study of the Austro-Hungarian Army during the First World War. It analyzes the operations of five infantry divisions, fighting on several different fronts, to reach conclusions about the wartime performance of the multinational Habsburg Army. The dissertation focusses on both tactical and socioethnic aspects of battlefield effectiveness. It is therefore a novel approach, combining operational and social history - This dissertation contradicts the prevailing historical perception that the wartime Austro-Hungarian Army was crippled by the nationalities issue. Instead, this revisionist work suggests that purely military shortcomings, principally poor high level leadership and a lack of industrial capacity, were the main causes of Habsburg defeat, and that the army actually performed respectably throughout the First World War despite its inherent weaknesses."

Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact

This is a collection of articles, published by the NATO Defense College. Foreword: "NATO’s defence and deterrence posture is the product of our 29 nations’ capabilities, resolve, and messaging. While our forces are mostly developed and owned by the nations, our credibility lies in our collective ability to combine our efforts across different domains: in command and control, capability development, partnerships, sustainment, human capital, and in training and exercises. Exercises are indeed a critically important piece of this equation: they prepare our troops, allow us to experiment new concepts, doctrine, and capabilities, convey a strategic message to potential opponents, and contribute to our lessons learned process..."

Ma guerre d'Algérie 1958-1960

This publication is an interesting war diary, with pictures taken by the author & his comrades, in two parts, by Guy Amand. Amand served as a regular soldier with the Commando Parachutiste de l'Air 10/541 from 1958 - 1962 in Algeria. Part-One | Part-Two. I can also recommend the book "A Savage War of Peace", by Alistair Horne, in order to understand the struggle & de-colonisation in Algeria.

Operation Dragoon: The Race Up the Rhone

A monograph by Michael T. Quigley, MAJ,   United States Army. Abstract: "While much has been written and learned from Operation Overlord and the invasion of Normandy, military leaders have largely ignored Operation Dragoon and the lessons it provides for future military operations. As the US Army enters into a period of declining resources and missions focused on worldwide employment of its combat power, Operation Dragoon provides a historical example for future forced entry operations over foreign shores in a resource and time constrained environment. Although set against the backdrop of the vast industrial capabilities of the US during World War II, Dragoon lacked resources, support, and time to plan the operation. These factors are all pertinent to today's US Army planners and commanders. As one of the most successful campaigns in World War II, modem military officers should be familiar with the exploits of the US Seventh Army and its French allies."

German Defense Tactics against Russian Breakthroughs | A Historical Study

The publication, from the Center of Military History United States Army ·Washington, D.C., sheds some light on the way how the German defence tactics against Soviet breakthroughs evolved on the Eastern Front. "This study was prepared by a group of former German generals and general staff officers. ... The principal author, who by the end of the war had attained the rank of general (Generaloberst), served on the Eastern Front throughout the Russian campaign and the subsequent retreat into tho plains of northern Germany. He was successively commander of an Infantry Brigade, a Panzer Division (November 1941 to February 1943), and two different Corps in the Battles for Kharkov and Belgorod."

Dien Bien Phu Myths | 5th Edition

"Historian Bernard Fall, still a leading authority on the French Indochina War even 70 years later, wrote about this pervading myth in his work, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu, effectively riposting any claims to the contrary through French Legionary archives and personal interviews." The following article, originally published in the UNRV Ancient Roman Empire Forums by User Sassinid Azatan, debunks the ten most common myths about the last major battle in French Indochina.