The Operational Leadership of Helmuth von Moltke

A paper by Gary J. Ohis Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps Reserve | "Understanding operational leadership is an important aspect of officer professionalism in the modern American military. By studying the evolution of this concept we can better comprehend its role in the current defense environment, and gain some insights into how it can be applied. Helmuth von Moltke is the prototype model for modern operational leadership. He provides a superb example in both his writings and in his actual application of the military arts. 

The collapse of the German army in the East in the summer of 1944

is a two volume publication, by Stephen Ariel Veal Portland State University. "The collapse of the German Army in the East in the Summer of 1944 is analyzed and determined to be the result of the following specific factors: German intelligence failures; German defensive doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed in the West; Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive doctrine and tactics. The collapse of Army Group Center, the destruction of the XIII Army Corps, and the collapse of Army Group South Ukraine in Romania during the Summer of 1944 are examined in detail. The significance of the collapse of the German Army in the East is compared to events occurring on the Anglo-American fronts and the German losses on both theaters of military operations are compared. The Soviet contributions to the defeat of the German Army during the Summer of 1944 are examined and the views of Soviet historiography and American historiography compared."

German Special Operations in the 1944 Ardennes Offensive

 

by Major Jeffrey Jarkowsky, US  Army is a historical analysis of the German special operations conducted in support of their overall Ardennes offensive. It focuses on the two major special operations of the German offensive, Operations "Greif" and "Stoesser." Operation Greif was the German attempt to infiltrate a commando unit behind American lines disguised as American soldiers. Operation Stoesser, the last German airborne operation of the war, was designed to secure a key cross-roads behind American lines.These special operations failed because of faulty planning, inadequate preparation, and a lack of coordination between the special and conventional forces. These problems, exacerbated by a lack of preparation time, resulted in a pair of ad-hoc units that were unable to accomplish their primary missions, although the operations were characterized by boldness, initiative, and improvisation. This study also examines the strategic setting, planning, preparatiors, and conduct of these operations, as well as their impact on the overall campaign. This study also examines the key lessons-learned that can be derived from both operations. Lastly, the study explores the implications of these lessons for the U.S. military of today.