Struggling against Inferiority: German Army Policy, 1890-1914

This thesis by Gavin J. Wiens offers us some insights about the diplomatic and geographic circumstances confronting Germany before the First World War and the maintenance of a large standing army. In 1890 the Prussian Minister of War, Julius von Verdy du Vernois, introduced a long-term program of army expansion intended to increase the number of active formations and provide all able-bodied German males with military training. Whereas considerable political and social obstacles, together with the inauguration of a naval construction program in 1898 precluded its completion, the possibility of a two-front war thereafter ensured that the "realization of compulsory military service" remained the fundamental objective of the General Staff. Not even the return of budgetary preference to the army following the second Moroccan crisis in 1911 and the subsequent approval of substantial army bills in 1912-13 diminished the intense pressure for a large-scale increase in the peacetime-strength and the implementation of the core principles of the "Verdy Plan."

The Operational Leadership of Helmuth von Moltke

A paper by Gary J. Ohis Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps Reserve | "Understanding operational leadership is an important aspect of officer professionalism in the modern American military. By studying the evolution of this concept we can better comprehend its role in the current defense environment, and gain some insights into how it can be applied. Helmuth von Moltke is the prototype model for modern operational leadership. He provides a superb example in both his writings and in his actual application of the military arts. 

The collapse of the German army in the East in the summer of 1944

is a two volume publication, by Stephen Ariel Veal Portland State University. "The collapse of the German Army in the East in the Summer of 1944 is analyzed and determined to be the result of the following specific factors: German intelligence failures; German defensive doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed in the West; Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive doctrine and tactics. The collapse of Army Group Center, the destruction of the XIII Army Corps, and the collapse of Army Group South Ukraine in Romania during the Summer of 1944 are examined in detail. The significance of the collapse of the German Army in the East is compared to events occurring on the Anglo-American fronts and the German losses on both theaters of military operations are compared. The Soviet contributions to the defeat of the German Army during the Summer of 1944 are examined and the views of Soviet historiography and American historiography compared."