German Special Operations in the 1944 Ardennes Offensive

 

by Major Jeffrey Jarkowsky, US  Army is a historical analysis of the German special operations conducted in support of their overall Ardennes offensive. It focuses on the two major special operations of the German offensive, Operations "Greif" and "Stoesser." Operation Greif was the German attempt to infiltrate a commando unit behind American lines disguised as American soldiers. Operation Stoesser, the last German airborne operation of the war, was designed to secure a key cross-roads behind American lines.These special operations failed because of faulty planning, inadequate preparation, and a lack of coordination between the special and conventional forces. These problems, exacerbated by a lack of preparation time, resulted in a pair of ad-hoc units that were unable to accomplish their primary missions, although the operations were characterized by boldness, initiative, and improvisation. This study also examines the strategic setting, planning, preparatiors, and conduct of these operations, as well as their impact on the overall campaign. This study also examines the key lessons-learned that can be derived from both operations. Lastly, the study explores the implications of these lessons for the U.S. military of today.

The lost partnership | Military cooperation of the Reichswehr and the US Army 1918-1933

„We needed to face the task to be able to provide the missing weapons latest at the start of an armed conflict. Similar to the US Army, which during peace times was little more powerful than our Reichswehr, had planned for a case of emergency based on the experience during the world war I in 1917. My journey to the US as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in 1927 provided very good insights for our needs.” This is how General Wilhelm Heye described his visit to the US and started a chapter of relations of the Reichswehr to a foreign force which has not been paid much attention to date. While the secret connections of the Reichswehr to the Red Army have been met with broad scientific interest and were subject of widespread investigation, the collaboration with the U.S. Army has so far not been in the focus of historical research. The missions between 1922 and 1933 of almost 30 officers, including well-known names such as Wilhelm Speidel, Werner von Blomberg and Walter Warlimont, are therefore almost completely unknown. | A Master Thesis by Paul Fröhlich (in German).

Jomini and the Ardennes: An Analysis of Lines of Operation and Decisive Points

This paper, by MAJ Thomas M. McGinnis, USA,  examines the applicability of the theories of the 19th Century military theorist, Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, to modern 20th Century mid-to high-intensity conflict. To do this it briefly reviews the core of Jomin' most famous work, The Art of War. It then tests two key Jominian concepts, lines of operation and decisive points against the reality of a major 20th Century operation, the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944. The study first sets the strategic and operational setting then traces the general conduct of the operation from the corps and army perspective. The first phase studied is the German offensive and American defensive from 16 December to 26 December 1944. The second is the American offensive and German defensive from 22 December 1944 to 28 January 1945.