Dien Bien Phu Myths | 5th Edition

"Historian Bernard Fall, still a leading authority on the French Indochina War even 70 years later, wrote about this pervading myth in his work, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu, effectively riposting any claims to the contrary through French Legionary archives and personal interviews." The following article, originally published in the UNRV Ancient Roman Empire Forums by User Sassinid Azatan, debunks the ten most common myths about the last major battle in French Indochina.  

Rethinking Counterinsurgency | A Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria

A thesis submitted by Samson Eyituoyo Liolio, Nigeria. Abstract: "The issue of Boko Haram in Nigeria has become a threat to both internal and international security with ever-growing violence and attacks on security forces, civilians, churches, media houses as well as international bodies such as the United Nations. With the increased numbers of cadres, improved and sophisticated weaponry, suicide bombing and well organised guerrilla tactics, Boko Haram’s challenge to the Nigerian state now also stretches across the entire 36 states of Nigeria, thus affecting its economic and social-political growth. With an aim of finding a solution that could lead to success in fending off the Boko Haram insurgency, this thesis explores the economic and political-cum-military forces at play between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram. It tries to investigate the apparatus of counterinsurgency earlier employed by the Nigerian state, thus also seeking to explain the possible counterproductive result or failure of counterinsurgency."

Operation Husky - The Campaign in Sicily

This is a case study, by Jon M. Swanson, LTC, USAF. Abstract: "The Allied decision to invade Sicily following the successful operation in North Africa was crucial to the conduct of World War II. The commitment of such a large force to

continued operations in the Mediterranean theater meant that the cross-channel invasion from Great Britain into northwest Europe would have to be delayed. If Sicily was chosen as the next step, it would come at the expense of other options favored by many political and military leaders.The American military commanders strongly favored a cross-channel invasion at the earliest possible opportunity. This meant that this invasion force would be the first priority for troops, shipping and equipment. On the other hand, the British favored an indirect approach that would see a major effort continue in the Mediterranean."

Counterinsurgency - The Hogard Doctrine

An interesting publication (in French) about a perhaps underrated (or forgotten?!) French COIN expert - "The concept of subversive warfare has once again come to resemble the one that had been paradoxically advocated by many leaders of the 18th century: to defeat the enemy without fighting,” according to Jacques Hogard. This French military officer belongs to the generation of lieutenants and captains who had fought against the already well-established phenomenon that reached its climax during the Cold War and has since been, in his words, “adopted by all modern barbarians.” To his credit, he reviewed the subject coldly and in its entirety, in order to better defeat it."

Quo vadis Deutsche Marine?

This article, by Alex Luck, gives us an overview about the current procurement situation of the German Navy (Bundesmarine). "On 17th June the German Navy reached a milestone by finally commissioning the first of their new F125-frigates, formally known as the Baden-Wuerttemberg-class. In some regards these ships set a new standard for Germany. "

A Review of Algerian War of National Liberation

Using the U.S. Army’s Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine, is a publication, by Karl Goetzke, COL, US Army. "The Algerian War of National Liberation is a classic counter-insurgency operation. A rebellion arising from within the Algerian population was transformed into an insurgency by the incorporation of an armed political campaign. Underlying this rebellion were socio-economic factors that typically galvanize any political campaign (e.g., distribution of wealth, participation in political intercourse). The catalyst for rebellion and resistance was a popular desire to end the French occupation of Algeria. While the indigenous population of Algeria was overwhelmingly Islamic, religious ideology was not a primary mobilizing factor behind the rebellion, unlike the current insurgencies faced in the War on Terrorism."

Commanders-in-Chief of the American War for Independence

A leadership study of George Washington and Sir William Howe, a thesis by Haydn. J. White, MAJ, Royal Marines. "The leadership of George Washington and Sir William Howe had a significant impact on the formative years of the American War for Independence. As Commanders-in-Chief between 1775 and 1778, what were the characteristics of their leadership, and how did this effect the prosecution of the war?"

The War of Independence | 1775-1783

"... or the American Revolution that was no Revolution: Another look at the Reasons", is a monograph by Hans G. Jansen. Preface: "To many, my thesis will appear as a criticism of the United States and our Founding Fathers. It is criticism only insofar that I approach all aspects of history with a critical mind.

The Battle of Königgrätz 1866 | The Evolution of Operational Art

This monograph, by Charles D. Daves, LTC, Signal Corps, US Army, focuses on "The Königgrätz Campaign offers an outstanding example of the offence operating on exterior lines and the use of the most advanced technology of the era in every phase of the campaign. With operational art as the focus, the importance of defining a clear operational end state and balancing the end state with means, ways, and risk will be analysed. This analysis includes a discussion of Moltke's application of certain theoretical aspects of operational art; these include exterior lines of operation, center of gravity, offence, decisive battle, and the interrelationship of strategic, operational and tactical activities.

Operational Design | Distilling Clarity from Complexity for Decisive Action

This comprehensive publication, by Jeffrey M. Reilly,  Department of Joint Warfare Studies Air Command and Staff College, is a collection of various case studies that analyse & explain the exploration of operational design as a transformative venture. "It represents a tremendous leap in intellectual theory that will have far-reaching implications on the future of planning. In spite of its obvious importance, however, design remains shrouded in the inherent complexities that cloak the operational level of war and the concepts involved in campaign planning."