The Campaign in Lorraine | Arracourt, September 1944

This battle study,  by Richard H. Barnes, MAJ, US Field Artillery, "...investigates operational and tactical considerations of the battles of Arracourt, which took place in September 1944 as the 4th Armored Division of Patton's Third Army clashed with the Fifth German Panzer Army in the French province of Lorraine on the U.S. drive to the German West Wall. By examining detailed German and American unit histories, logs, and summaries, as well as personal papers, this study illuminates differences and similarities in reporting the U.S. penetration from the Nancy Bridgehead to Arracourt, the German offensive at Luneville as a prelude to Arracourt, and the two German offensives at Arracourt, as the Fifth Panzer Army attempted to link up with a German unit cut off at Nancy. Arracourt exemplifies penetration and mobile defense and illustrates the demand for good intelligence and flexible command and control. It shows the inherent risks of piecemeal commitment of reserves, the need for timely orders and good logistical support, as well as the tactical advantages."

Operation Dragoon: The Race Up the Rhone

A monograph by Michael T. Quigley, MAJ,   United States Army. Abstract: "While much has been written and learned from Operation Overlord and the invasion of Normandy, military leaders have largely ignored Operation Dragoon and the lessons it provides for future military operations. As the US Army enters into a period of declining resources and missions focused on worldwide employment of its combat power, Operation Dragoon provides a historical example for future forced entry operations over foreign shores in a resource and time constrained environment. Although set against the backdrop of the vast industrial capabilities of the US during World War II, Dragoon lacked resources, support, and time to plan the operation. These factors are all pertinent to today's US Army planners and commanders. As one of the most successful campaigns in World War II, modem military officers should be familiar with the exploits of the US Seventh Army and its French allies."

Dien Bien Phu Myths | 5th Edition

"Historian Bernard Fall, still a leading authority on the French Indochina War even 70 years later, wrote about this pervading myth in his work, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu, effectively riposting any claims to the contrary through French Legionary archives and personal interviews." The following article, originally published in the UNRV Ancient Roman Empire Forums by User Sassinid Azatan, debunks the ten most common myths about the last major battle in French Indochina.  

Counterinsurgency - The Hogard Doctrine

An interesting publication (in French) about a perhaps underrated (or forgotten?!) French COIN expert - "The concept of subversive warfare has once again come to resemble the one that had been paradoxically advocated by many leaders of the 18th century: to defeat the enemy without fighting,” according to Jacques Hogard. This French military officer belongs to the generation of lieutenants and captains who had fought against the already well-established phenomenon that reached its climax during the Cold War and has since been, in his words, “adopted by all modern barbarians.” To his credit, he reviewed the subject coldly and in its entirety, in order to better defeat it."

A Review of Algerian War of National Liberation

Using the U.S. Army’s Current Counterinsurgency Doctrine, is a publication, by Karl Goetzke, COL, US Army. "The Algerian War of National Liberation is a classic counter-insurgency operation. A rebellion arising from within the Algerian population was transformed into an insurgency by the incorporation of an armed political campaign. Underlying this rebellion were socio-economic factors that typically galvanize any political campaign (e.g., distribution of wealth, participation in political intercourse). The catalyst for rebellion and resistance was a popular desire to end the French occupation of Algeria. While the indigenous population of Algeria was overwhelmingly Islamic, religious ideology was not a primary mobilizing factor behind the rebellion, unlike the current insurgencies faced in the War on Terrorism."

French Airborne Operations in Indochina

The full title of the thesis written by Gordon A. Cromley B.A., The Ohio State University is "Using Digital & Historical Gazetteeers to Geocode French Airborne Operations during the French Indochina War." - "The French Indochina War has been given many nicknames but perhaps one of the most insightful was “the war of the vast empty spaces” which was memorialised in Bernard Fall’s (1961) book The Street Without Joy. Another historian, Douglas Porch also characterised the War as the “Paratrooper’s War” (Porch, 1991). However, there are very works in English that discuss this aspect of the French Indochina War in any systematic detail. It is the purpose of this thesis to provide a spatial understanding of French Paratroop Operations (Operations Aeroporte) or OAPs by developing a spatial database of airborne operations so that future research can examine the nature of airborne operations during the French Indochina War and how the spatial experiences of those involved in it influenced counterinsurgency doctrine used by militaries across the globe."

Trinquier and Galula | French COIN Theories in the Algerian War

This thesis, by Charles F. Waterfall, Special Agent, FBI  is "An examination of counterinsurgency methods used by the French in the Algerian War can lead to a better understanding of today's insurgencies... - From 1954 to 1962, France fought a bitter and brutal counterinsurgency war in Algeria. In the wake of defeat in Indochina (Vietnam), France was determined not to lose in Algeria. Unlike its other overseas territories, Algeria was regarded as being part of France proper and not simply as a colony. Roger Trinquier and David Galula served as officers in the French Army and were posted to Algeria during the conflict known in France as the Algerian War. Both officers documented their first hand observations and actions in their attempts to counter the insurgents. Examinations of their works shed light on today's insurgencies."

The generalship of Vo Nguyen Giap

During my research and virtual visits to the archives I have stumbled upon three interesting studies | monographs about Vo Nguyen Giap, the iconic military leader of the struggle against first the French and later on the US Americans & South Vietnamese in Indochina | Vietnam. The Generalship of Giap — The Myths and the Realities, by Douglas M. Eye, LTC, ADA | General Vo Nguyen Giap -  Operational Genius or Lucky Amateur? by Chark W. Alsup, LTC, US Army &  A critical analysis of the operational performance of General Vo Nguyen Giap 1940–1954, by Stuart Pascoe, MAJ, Australian Army.

France’s War in Mali | Lessons for an Expeditionary Army

"This report, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army,  by Michael Shurkin, presents key observations and an analysis of French Army operations in Mali in 2013 as a model for what an expeditionary, regionally aligned force might look like, one that meets a number of U.S. Army desiderata regarding tailorability, scalability at a level lower than a brigade, and light deployment and sustainment requirements."

Fall Gelb & the German Blitzkrieg of 1940 | Operational Art?

"The objective of this study is to determine if the German 'Blitzkrieg' and Fall Gelb of 1940 were an expression of operational art.  Despite the mythology surrounding Fall Gelb, the campaign does not constitute a major breakthrough in operational art by the Germans." by Major Richard S. Richardson.

Air Power in Irregular Warfare

A thesis by Major Steven J. Ayre and Major Jeremy F. Hough.

"History is full of with examples of innovations that have proved essential to victory in war. Few innovations have provided the consistent and often decisive impact that air power has delivered in conflict. Across its relatively short history, the concept of air power has maintained a resiliency of innovation across the doctrinal, strategic, organizational, and technological levels. However, warfare itself has witnessed significant changes over the course of the last century. No longer is the classical, conventional state-onstate conflict the principal method of combating one’s enemies. In its place, irregular warfare (IW) has arguably become the norm in conflict today."

When does Counterinsurgency work?

An Analysis of Counterinsurgency Campaigns after 1945, by Maryum Alam. Introduction: Insurgency and counterinsurgency, a particular form of asymmetric warfare in the international system, is not a new phenomenon. History is replete with examples of ethno nationalist armed groups challenging and defeating superior states for control over a given  territory. This study seeks an answer to a simple question: does counterinsurgency work, and if so, which counterinsurgency policies are associated with state success? 

Contemporary Counterinsurgency | Insights from the French-Algerian War

We give express charge, that in our marches through the country, there be nothing compelled from the villages, nothing taken but paid for, none of the French upbraided or abused in disdainful language; for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner. William Shakespeare, Henry V, Act III Scene 6. One of the opening paragraphs of this interesting monograph by Lt Colonel Kenneth M. DeTreux that sums it up.

Helicopters in Irregular Warfare | Algeria, Vietnam & Afghanistan

Major Beau G. Rollie explains in his master thesis the impact of helicopters on the battlefield in non-conventional wars. Preface: The preponderance of conflicts fought over the last seventy years have included or been centred on irregular warfare and counter-insurgency. Indeed, the helicopter's first significant trials in combat took place during the Algerian War 1954-1962, the Vietnam War 1955-1975, and the Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989. During these wars, the French, U.S., and Soviet militaries used significant numbers of helicopters to fight insurgents and guerrillas, and each country lost their respective conflict.

Detailed French OOB | The French-Algerian War 1954-1962

The rest of this amazing find (Thanks FZS-Eagle!) can be found here at the forum. More details about how the French organised their forces and why Algeria was the first real helicopter war, check them out at this and that link.

The Algerian War | A Model for Counterinsurgency Operations

by Kyoichi Tachikawa. No, this time it's not a 400+ dossier, monograph or thesis. It's a quick and comprehensive read of just 16-pages that summarises, in a very detailed way however, what COIN strategies or tactics the French employed in Algeria. 

Lessons From the Indo-China War | Part II

... issued by the Supreme Command, Far East, May 31, 1955. In retrospect a very detailed study (nearly 400 pages!). This paper itself leads to the correct conclusions, but nobody seems to have cared reading it. Hindsight 20/20 ... Still. A must read for those of you who want to know more detailed background information about the struggle in French-Indochina.

The French-Algerian War and FM 3-24 | Counterinsurgency: A Comparison

Many aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in today's contemporary operating environment suggest that historical reviews of previous COIN experiences can provide critical insight. However, the results of such reviews tended to fail to be incorporated into military doctrine as the passage of time reduced the perceived relevance of previous experiences.

The French campaign against the FLN

Yes... yet another study about the 'struggle' in Algeria. Nevertheless, a very interesting one that sheds some light on how the French intended to 'pacify' one of their most crucial North African possessions. Read all about it at Constantin Melniks's paper.

French Army Strategy & Strategic Culture

during the Algerian War, 1954-1958. A very interesting thesis submitted by Wynne M. Beers to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History.